America Can Overthrow Dictators. It Can’t Manufacture Democracy.
Sahand Center for Global Policy
Joseph Hovsepian
U.S. forces toppled Saddam Hussein in weeks in Iraq, and they quickly removed the Taliban from Kabul in 2001 in Afghanistan, only to see the movement return to power two decades later. However, Germany and Japan were conquered after World War II yet established enduring democratic structures. Conversely, U.S. foreign policy deployments from the early 20th century to the 21st century have relied upon regime change as an important political tool. The differences illuminate a fundamental issue in American strategy: while the military may be able to determine who governs, it cannot determine a legitimate, viable, and durable political order after. Thus, democracy may follow intervention, but it is most likely when outside power works with institutions, social conditions, and domestic political bargains that can sustain it after occupation ends.
Removing a Regime Is Not the Same as Building Democracy
It is easier to establish an authoritarian government by force than it is to build the political base of democracy. A foreign-imposed regime change may be successfully implemented to dispose of an incumbent regime but result in the establishment of institutions that are not legitimate to domestic political entities (Downes and Monten, 2013). Taking the example of Iraq, despite the successful US intervention in removing Saddam Hussein in 2003, the insurgency and civil war that subsequently ensued illustrate that military intervention can oust a regime but not create enough political will and legitimacy to sustain a democratic political order (Downes & Monten, 2013). Dobbins et al. (2003) also demonstrate the need for functioning administration, security, political structures, and economic recovery following military victory for post-conflict reconstruction. The United States has tried to reform foreign political systems on multiple occasions in the past, and that American interventions have increasingly meant state reconstruction and regime change (Downes and Monten, 2013). However, the results have been different from Germany’s and Japan’s. The military force can thus provide the political space for the change, but not establish public trust, institutional capacity or consensus among conflicting political groups. The distinction matters because elections and constitutions may be introduced quickly while the deeper political foundations necessary to sustain them remain weak.
Germany and Japan: The Important Counterexamples
Germany and Japan prove that external support works if military intervention is accompanied by favorable domestic conditions. After the Second World War both nations had total defeat, long occupation and comprehensive reconstruction, which were unusual for political transformation (Dobbins et al., 2008). They also state that Germany had had prior experience of democracy, while Japan had significant institutional structures that could be amended instead of written off. Parliamentary traditions derived from the Weimar experience, a ready party system comprising, for example, the SPD and Center party, and a viable federal system and administration inherited by and fitted into the Federal Republic formed building materials for a West German democracy (Dobbins et al., 2008). These cases are therefore challenging the argument that foreign intervention can never generate democracy. Instead, they argue that American power would work if it worked through existing administrative structure rather than seeking to build an entire political structure from scratch.
Japan, in particular, demonstrates the importance of institutional continuity. The U.S. Occupation faced no fully alternative political blueprint in the Japanese landscape - Japan had existing experience of parliamentary government through the Imperial Diet, competitive parties, elections and cabinet leadership by parties in the Taisho period (1918-1932) (Dobbins et al., 2008). The occupation of 1945-1952 sought demilitarization and democratization, such as the 1947 Constitution, land reform, civil rights and civil liberties, workers' rights, and suffrage for women. Japan's experience, accordingly, was not merely the one of the American imposition of democracy by force. It was a case in which it was possible for American authority to make use of state capacity but at the same time to change their political rules.
Iraq and Afghanistan: When Regime Change Outruns State-Building
The destruction of established political institutions makes the reconstruction of democracy significantly more challenging, like Iraq. The U.S. intervention faced a traditional political system with little democracy heritage (Bellin, 2004), and along with some political and institutional obstacles, there were significant challenges to democratization in the post-invasion setting (Byman, 2003). Between 2003 and 2012 the United States expended over $60 billion on reconstruction activities in Iraq; however massive waste and fraud, and failed management of individual projects, had prevented the funds expended from establishing durable and functional institutions (Dobbins et al., 2008)). The Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq implemented de-Ba'athification and dismantled key institutions, which created a security vacuum that fueled an insurgency especially among the marginalized Sunnis, reducing the viability of the new government by demonstrating the inability to ensure security and provide representation . Haddad (2012) also discusses how sectarian divisions have increasingly played a role in the nature of political competition in post-invasion Iraq, and Kingma (2012) demonstrates how the lack of coherent political coalitions in Iraq made the creation of an inclusive Iraqi national government difficult. The United States thus had achieved a military victory against Saddam Hussein but left itself with the greater challenge of creating trusted and legitimate institutions in a fractious and insecure environment, where the voices of various communities vied for power. Elections might form governments, yet they were not going to solve the tensions over sectarian competition and insecurity, lower levels of administrative capacity, or lack of support for the new political system itself. Iraq thus offers evidence of how democratic processes are different from a democratic system that supports peaceful political competition.
Afghanistan also shows another facet of the same difficulty, the need for major national political, military, financial support from outside. The objective of building stable, representative and accountable Afghan institutions was not met, citing concerns with legitimacy, corruption, centralization, and the government's reliance on external support (SIGAR, 2022). In its 2021 report SIGAR points to the fact that American attempts to create modern governance often reinforced patronage systems, and its attempts to understand the political and social dynamic of Afghanistan were inadequate. Although Afghanistan developed elections, a constitution, and formal democratic institutions after 2001, those institutions remained vulnerable because the Afghan state lacked sufficient independent legitimacy and capacity to survive the withdrawal of U.S. military support. For reconstruction in Afghanistan, American expenditure was around $145 Billion, with an estimate of 2,443 U.S. Servicemen having been killed, 48,000+ Afghan civilians have also died, depicting the sheer human and monetary costs for failure to establish a sustainable democracy (SIGAR, 2022). The collapse of government in August 2021 thus showed the need to consider whether institutions could survive - or even thrive - with external protection withdrawn.
Panama: An Exception That Sharpens the Argument
Panama shows that U.S.-led regime change can result in a relatively peaceful transition even when the conditions that are identified in Germany and Japan are not present in every regard. A good example is Operation Just Cause in December 1989, which toppled Manuel Noriega, and the attempts to restore civilian rule and to rebuild political institutions (Furlong, 1993). Panama's shift documents the disappearance of military political power and the re-construction of civilian democratic power. Panama, however, was not a society as deeply divided and as shattered as Iraq, so requiring the Americans to rebuild the shattered structure of a state over a wide domain. This was helped by Panama's ties with the United States and the strategic value of the Panama Canal (Ropp, 1992); these legacies led to an ongoing American presence in Panama's stabilization. Panama thus strengthens rather than destroys the broader argument: when the intervention has narrower objectives, when basic institutions remain available, and when external support is strategically sustained, the burden of democratic reconstruction is considerably smaller than it was in Iraq or Afghanistan.
What Conditions Make Democracy More Durable?
These above cases together demonstrate that the success or failure of democratization was tied to the nature of the transition to new regimes. Both Germany and Japan had already successfully administered government before transition, maintained functioning bureaucracies, possessed experience with politics, whereas Iraq had neither, losing all established institutions and being fraught with sectarian violence and insurgency. Conversely, Afghanistan lost the capacity to govern to the international actors and became dependent upon them, while Panama proves that less audacious reform goals plus administrative capacity and continuous US engagement allows for successful consolidation (Bellin, 2004). Evidence thus indicates that in the U.S., durable democracy is most likely to be achieved when domestic institutions can adapt to reform, rival actors have an interest in playing by the rules from within, and conditions of security enable institutions to evolve naturally without permanent foreign support.
Policy Implication
The United States should evaluate the political conditions for the day after regime change before deciding that military victory is sufficient to justify intervention. This is necessary for planning and envisaging the post-combat period of reconstruction, as well as engaging in combat planning, since poor internal conditions can greatly affect the opportunities for incumbent external forces to promote democratization (Downes and Monten, 2013). All U.S. policy decisions ought to take into account whether any existing administrative structure is functional, and whether the people of that country hold the authorities to account, have economically viable internal clearing mechanisms for popular discontent, and elect leaders capable of ruling without additional indefinite American protection. Finally, maintaining useful institutions is potentially a more effective way of countering an attack on them than to dismantle them from force and then try to rebuild them (Denison, 2020). When such conditions do not exist, U.S. policymakers should question whether the political environment that follows regime change can sustain a democratic order without indefinite American support.
Conclusion
Therefore, American foreign policy record indicates that the US is far more effective at regime removal than at establishing democratic regimes afterward. Germany and Japan prove that external democratization is feasible if the success of regime change is reinforced through continued support, state reconstruction, and conducive political conditions, yet Iraq and Afghanistan prove otherwise: these three factors are crucial for democratization to succeed. Panama, shows how the difficult task of nation reconstruction can be facilitated by more limited aims, institutional continuity, and strong US ties.
References
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