A New Balkanization of the South Caucasus?
Joseph Hovsepian
Sahand Center for Global policy
The new Armenia-Azerbaijan peace and connectivity plan is a centerpiece of a paradox: while building infrastructure that can help defuse conflict and make it easier for the states to cooperate, it may also re-distribute power and increase competition in the region. In the context of developing Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, it is important to note that the August 8, 2025 Joint Declaration included a component for the opening of communication between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including “unimpeded connectivity” between Azerbaijan's main territory and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory, with the requirement to respect sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan & Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2025). TRIPP is more than a transport project, as it is connected with peace-building, trade diversification and strategic importance of the South Caucasus. Therefore, TRIPP can support durable regional integration only if its connectivity arrangements preserve Armenian sovereignty, provide reciprocal economic benefits, and are embedded in inclusive regional governance; otherwise, the project risks producing a new pattern of geopolitical fragmentation in which infrastructure becomes an arena for competition among Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and Western powers.
Why the South Caucasus Is Vulnerable to “Balkanization”
Hints of the possibility of Balkanization are provided by the interplay among unresolved conflicts, competing national projects and party ambition, as well as low-quality regional institutions and external-power struggles over a strategically sensitive geographical nexus. According to Guliyev (2026), Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia is a region of disintegration, uncertainty over borders, segmented economy, and weak institutions of multilateral cooperation. In his definition of Balkanization, Trapara (2020) posits that it is anachronism in the context of the early modern state, but notes that it is the involvement of great powers in the process of Balkanization that is important. The framework is also applicable to the South Caucasus region as it is the bridge between Russia, Turkey, Iran, Europe and Central Asia. Its geography provides transportation routes with strategic significance other than their commercial use. The question is therefore not how to guarantee that the South Caucasus as a whole will inevitably agonize through Balkan-type conflicts and split. It is how to ensure that instead of becoming a source of unity, connectivity will not become another cause of division within the region in light of various rival national interests and external relations.
The New U.S. Approach: Peace through Connectivity
The U.S.-sponsored program aims to establish transportation and economic ties as tools for promoting Armenia-Azeri peace settlement. In this regard, the Joint Declaration promotes intra-state, bilateral and international transportation, and also establishes TRIPP as a project to develop the Armenia-U.S. initiative for connectivity within Armenia with U.S. participation (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan & Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2025). The TRIPP Implementation Framework outlines the project in terms of multimodal transport connections between the mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan region and mutual benefits for Armenia and relations with Trans-Caspian Trade Route (United States & Republic of Armenia 2026). Parpiyev et al. (2026) show that TRIPP would enhance diversification of the supply routes in the Eurasia region, help to increase diversification in transport movements to and from Armenia, and establish transit and economic opportunities in the region. The reasoning behind the argument was that trade, investment, employment and interdependence can make peaceful relations even more desirable to those involved in the process. While connectivity is the first of the three factors, Guliyev (2026) suggests that regional fragmentation cannot be overcome by only connectivity: additional institutional cooperation and some regional vision convergence are needed for long-term regional building. Whereas TRIPP can establish physical conditions for integration, governance will decide on whether it will result in a network of cooperating institutions or corridors of competing institutions.
The Geopolitical Problem: A Corridor Is Never Just a Corridor
Because multipoint regional transportation systems influence more than one country in various ways, the impact of TRIPP on regional power dynamics can be dynamic and complex. The project can help Azerbaijan to connect directly with Nakhchivan and for Turkey it may strengthen east-west ties with Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Some of the obstacles that Parpiyev et al. (2026) look at are regional competition, the volatility of laws regarding unimpeded movement, legal uncertainty, and financing constraints. The Armenian side of the border is an economic opportunity for Armenia but this raises questions as to how the border will function under the leadership of Armenia. Connecting the triple concerns of connectivity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction is part of the very essence of the Joint Declaration that tries to reconcile the interests of both states.
The geopolitical significance of the corridor is complicated even further by Iran, Russia and Turkey. Iran has strategic reasons to keep its border with Armenia and to oppose arrangements for transport that may diminish Iran's regional access or provide greater access to Azerbaijani influence. Despite the shift in Armenia's regional landscape, Russia is still a significant player whose interests are now under scrutiny by Armenia's trajectory toward Western partnerships and alternate transportation routes (Guliyev, 2026). The economic and political interest of the Country of Turkey to intensify their ties with Azerbaijan and Central Asia is also strong. Thus TRIPP may provide opportunities for cooperation or arbitrage, but also exacerbate competition if a player feels it loses its influence or leverage by that corridor.
Diversification also has implications for Russia and Iran, as that could disrupt existing transportation and geopolitical dynamics. Ohanyan (2026) believes that the Washington model is more of part of a larger infrastructure modernization and diversification of Europe and Eurasia that could enhance the autonomy of the South Caucasus and bolster competition between major powers. Likewise, Guliyev (2026) demonstrates that connectivity programs could be viewed both as a means for economic gain and as an instrument of geopolitical security. A corridor designed to link markets can thus have varying strategic implications - one state may experience economic openness while another experiences a diminished influence, or still another experiences an increased security exposure. The main predicament, consequently, is how to keep an economic undertaking from turning into a "win/win" geopolitical instrument.
Armenia between Competing Powers
While gaining strategic independence from Russia, Armenia is also entering into a more complex balancing game between Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran, the U.S. and the West. Part of Armenia's attempts to diversify its external ties is due to the necessity of distancing itself from the Russian influence in order to ensure its sovereignty and economic security. The TRIPP legislation will provide Armenia with potential foreign investments, infrastructure development and better linkages with Western markets and will also ensure the own territorial sovereignty, customs, security and law enforcement (United States & Republic of Armenia, 2026). Azeri and Turkish security and economic issues remain significant, despite this, however, as Armenia must balance both manage requests for regional connectivity and be able to secure territorial rights. Iran is also important on the grounds that Armenia limits itself from relying on only Azerbaijan or Turkey-controlled traffic through Armenia by maintaining its relationship with Iran. On the other hand, TRIPP can increase Armenia's strategic possibilities without removing its/security vulnerabilities, as put forward by Ohanyan (2026). Hence, Armenia is becoming more strategically autonomous from Russian influence, and the need to balance Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iran and the Western powers are what makes Armenia more independent and autonomous, not replacing one dependency with another.
Lessons from the Balkans — Without Forcing the Analogy
The Balkans analogy can be helpful if structural comparisons are drawn and if it does not signify the same eventual result. Trapara (2020) sources the elements of Balkanization to fragmentation, competing national projects, unresolved political relations, and great-power involvement. This situation is also present in the South Caucasus – a region in the world where a handful of small states exist alongside unresolved territorial issues and conflicting external interest groups. These parallels warrant little more than cautionary words about Balkanization. But there are significant differences, however, that make it impossible to repeat history easily. The Joint Declaration establishes the basis of connectivity in respect to sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction and the TRIPP framework is based on the principle of Armenian control over the borders, customs, security and law enforcement authorities (President of the Republic of Azerbaijan & Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 2025; United States & Republic of Armenia, 2026). Guliyev (2026) also demonstrates that connections can facilitate the emergence of cooperation in a fractious area. The lesson of the Balkans is not that it is inevitable that the South Caucasus would be divided into many states, but that infrastructure should be matched with institutions that can handle conflicting interests.
What a More Durable U.S. Policy Would Require
The more robust U.S. policy would thus need to assess whether TRIPP would actually help to alleviate fragmentation instead of taking it for granted that connectivity will lead to integration. The most compelling counter-evidence is that regional infrastructure can enhance competition when issues of sovereignty, security and economic advantage are not settled. Guliyev (2026) has highlighted regional interests and weak regional institutions as ongoing pressures of fragmentation, while Parpiyev et al. (2026) have pointed to political, economic and institutional constraints on the feasibility of TRIPP. The concerns indicate that many issues cannot be resolved through infrastructure alone, including lack of trust between Armenia, Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Iran, Russia and Western actors. A consistent U.S. stance would thus have to uphold Armenian sovereignty, facilitate mutually beneficial economic cooperation, involve other players in the region, and provide processes to deal with conflict and institutionalize cooperation between the parties (Ohanyan, 2026; United States & Republic of Armenia, 2026). Thus, there's no evidence to suggest that TRIPP will offer a path toward avoiding Balkanization; it remains to be seen if U.S. policy can make connectivity more of an opportunity for inclusive institutions, normalizing politics, and finding common regional interests, or another battleground in geopolitical competition.
Conclusion
The crux of TRIPP is the South Caucasian dichotomy between proximity achieved through infrastructure and geopolitical rivalry. Physical links are not enough to overcome fragmentation, the Joint Declaration talks about connectivity around the sovereignty, territorial integrity and mutual benefits. The Balkans comparison is an alert to unresolved problems and rivalries for external powers – not a forecast of future parities. Thus, the goal of TRIPP will rely on its potential to be an open network that achieves sovereignty, reciprocity, security, and institutional policies, or a strategic corridor that belongs to rival blocs. Cooperation and peace-building is possible with connectivity, but a lasting peace requires governance which is conducive to cooperation over time, rather than to division.
References
Guliyev, F. (2026). The South Caucasus: Connectivity initiatives and regional fragmentation. Third World Quarterly, 47(11), 2262–2283. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2026.2621911
Ohanyan, A. (2026). Peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan: What TRIPP can and cannot achieve (SCEEUS Guest Report No. 1, 2026). Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/peace-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-what-tripp-can-and-cannot-achieve/
Parpiyev, S., Yermekbayev, A., & Ilyas, N. (2026). The viability and feasibility of TRIPP in the Middle Corridor: Opportunities and constraints. Eurasian Research Journal, 8(3), 325–345. https://doi.org/10.53277/2519-2442-2026.3-05
President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, & President of the United States of America. (2025, August 8). Joint declaration on the outcomes of their meeting in Washington, D.C., United States of America. https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/2025JointDeclaration.AzerbaijanArmenia.pdf
Trapara, V. (2020). The Balkans as geopolitical periphery of Eastern Europe: Past implications for an uncertain future. In A. Jović-Lazić & A. Troude (Eds.), Security challenges and the place of the Balkans and Serbia (pp. 75–86). Institute of International Politics and Economics & Faculty of Security Studies. https://doi.org/10.18485/iipe_balkans_rssc.2020.ch5
United States & Republic of Armenia. (2026). The TRIPP Implementation Framework (TIF). https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/TRIPP-Implementation-Framework.pdf
